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In quantum key distribution, measurement-device-independent and decoy-state techniques enable
the two cooperative agents to establish a shared secret key using imperfect measurement devices and
weak Poissonian sources, respectively. Investigations so far are not comprehensive as they restrict
to less than or equal to four decoy states. Moreover, many of them involves pure numerical studies.
Here I report a general security proof that works for any fixed number of decoy states and any
fixed raw key length. The two key ideas involved here. The first one is the repeated application of
the inversion formula for Vandermonde matrix to obtain various bounds on certain yields and error
rates. The second one is the use of a recently proven generalization of the McDiarmid inequality.
These techniques rise the best provably secure key rate of the measurement-device-independent
version of the BB84 scheme by at least 1.25 times and increase the workable distance between the
two cooperative agents from slightly less than 60 km to slightly greater than 130 km in case there
are 1010 photon pulse pair sent without a quantum repeater.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the art for two
trusted agents, commonly refers to as Alice and Bob,
to share a provably secure secret key by preparing and
measuring quantum states that are transmitted through
a noisy channel controlled by an eavesdropper Eve who
has unlimited computational power. In realistic QKD
setup, decoy-state technique allows Alice and Bob to
obtain their secret key using the much more practical
weak phase-randomized Poissonian sources [1, 2]. In ad-
dition, measurement-device-independent (MDI) method
enables them to use imperfect apparatus that may be
controlled by Eve to perform measurement [3]. Decoy-
state technique has been extensively studied. In fact,
this technique can be applied to many different QKD
schemes [1, 2, 4–6]. Researches on the effective use of
a general number of decoys have been conducted [7–10].
The effect of finite raw key length on the key rate has
been investigated [5, 8–11]. Nonetheless, security and ef-
ficiency analyses on the combined use of decoy-state and
MDI techniques are less comprehensive. So far, they are
restricted to less than or equal to four decoy states [12–
21]. Furthermore, it is unclear how to extend these meth-
ods analytically to an arbitrary but fixed number of de-
coys. Along a slightly different line, the case of finite
raw key length for the combined use of decoy-state and
MDI techniques has been studied. So far, these studies
applied Azuma, Hoeffding and Sefling inequalities as well
as Chernoff bound in a straightforward manner [15, 17–
21].
Here I report the security analysis and a key rate for-
mula for the BB84-based [22] MDI-QKD using passive
partial Bell state detection for finite raw key length with
the condition that Alice and Bob each uses an arbitrary
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but fixed number of decoys. One of the key ideas in this
work is the repeated use of the analytical formula for
the elements of the inverse of a Vandermonde matrix. A
tight bound on various yields and error rates for a general
number of decoys can then be obtained through this ana-
lytical formula. (Actually, Yuan et al. also used repeated
Vandermonde matrix inversion to obtain upper and lower
bounds of the so-called two-single-photon yield in case
one of the photon intensities used is 0 [23]. Nevertheless,
the bounds reported here are more general and powerful
than theirs.) The other key idea used here is the ap-
plication of a powerful generalization of the McDiarmid
inequality in mathematical statistics recently proven in
Ref. [10]. This inequality is effective to tackle finite size
statistical fluctuation of certain error rates involved in
the key rate formula.
I compute the secure key rate for the MDI-version of
the BB84 scheme using the setup and channel studied by
Zhou et al. in Ref. [18]. The best provably secure key rate
for this setup before this work are reported by Mao et al.
in Ref. [20]. Compared to their work, in case the total
number of photon pulse pair send by Alice and Bob is
1010, the provably secure key rate using this new method
is increased by at least 125%. Besides, the maximum
transmission distance is increased from slightly less than
60 km to slightly greater than 130 km. This demonstrates
the effectiveness of this new approach for MDI-QKD.
II. THE MDI-QKD PROTOCOL
In this paper, the polarization of all photon pulses are
prepared either in X-basis with photon intensity µX,i (for
i = 1, 2, · · · , kX) or in Z-basis with photon intensity µZ,i
(for i = 1, 2, · · · , kZ). For simplicity, I label these photon
intensities in descending order by µX,1 > µX,2 > · · · >
µX,kX ≥ 0 and similarly for µZ,i’s. I denote the probability
of choosing the preparation basis B ∈ {X, Z} by pB and
the probability of choosing photon intensity µB,i given
2the preparation basis B by pi|B.
Here I study the following MDI-QKD protocol, which
is a BB84-based scheme originally studied in Refs. [3, 15].
1. Alice and Bob each has a phase-randomized Pois-
sonian distributed source. Each of them randomly
and independently prepares a photon pulse and
sends it to the untrusted third party Charlie. They
jot down the intensity and polarization used for
each pulse.
2. Charlie performs a partial Bell state measurement
like the ones in Refs. [3, 15, 24]. He publicly
announces the measurement result including non-
detection and inconclusive events.
3. Alice and Bob reveal the basis and intensity they
used for each of their prepared photon pulse. If
the preparation bases of a pair of photon pulses
they have sent to Charlie for Bell basis measure-
ment disagree, they discard them. If both pulses
are prepared in the X-basis, they reveal their prepa-
ration polarizations. They also randomly reveal the
preparation polarizations of a few pulses that they
have both prepared in the Z-basis. In this way, they
can estimate the various yields and error rates to
be defined in Sec. III.
4. They use the preparation information of their re-
maining photon pulses that have been conclusively
measured by Charlie to generate their raw secret
keys and then perform error correction and privacy
amplification on these keys to obtain their final se-
cret keys according to the MDI-QKD procedure re-
ported in Refs. [3, 24]. (Here I assume that Alice
and Bob use forward reconciliation to establish the
key. The case of reverse reconciliation can be stud-
ied in a similar manner.)
III. BOUNDS ON VARIOUS YIELDS AND
ERROR RATES IN THE MDI-SETTING
I use the symbol QB,i,j to denote the yield given that
both Alice and Bob prepare their photons in B-basis and
that Alice (Bob) uses photon intensity µB,i (µB,j) for
B = X, Z and i, j = 1, 2, · · · , kB. More precisely, it is the
portion of photon pairs prepared using the above descrip-
tion that Charlie declares conclusive detection. Further-
more, I define the error rate of these photon pairsEB,i,j as
the portion of those conclusively detected photons above
whose prepared polarizations by Alice and Bob are the
same. And I set E¯B,i,j = 1 − EB,i,j . Similar to the case
of standard (that is, non-MDI) implementation of QKD,
for phase randomized Poissonian photon sources [24],
QB,i,j =
+∞∑
a,b=0
µa
B,iµ
b
B,jYB,a,b exp(−µB,i) exp(−µB,j)
a! b!
(1)
and
QB,i,jEB,i,j
=
+∞∑
a,b=0
µa
B,iµ
b
B,jYB,a,beB,a,b exp(−µB,i) exp(−µB,j)
a! b!
. (2)
Here, YB,a,b is the probability of conclusive detection by
Charlie given that the photon pulses sent by Alice (Bob)
contains a (b) photons and eB,a,b is the corresponding bit
error rate of the raw key. Furthermore, I denote the yield
conditioned on Alice preparing a vacuum state and Bob
preparing in the B-basis by the symbol YB,0,⋆. Clearly,
YB,0,⋆ obeys
YB,0,⋆ =
kB∑
j=1
pj|BY˜B,0,j, (3)
where Y˜B,0,j is the yield conditioned on Alice sending the
vacuum state and Bob sending photon with intensity µB,j
in the B-basis.
I need to deduce the possible values of YB,i,j’s and
YB,i,jeB,i,j from Eqs. (1) and (2). One way to do it is
to compute various lower and upper bounds of YB,i,j ’s
and YB,i,jeB,i,j by brute force optimization of truncated
versions of Eqs. (1) and (2) like the method reported in
Refs. [12, 15, 16]. However, this approach is rather inel-
egant and ineffective. Further note that Alice and Bob
have no control on the values of YB,a,b’s and eB,a,b’s since
Charlie and Eve are not trustworthy. All they know is
that these variables are between 0 and 1. Fortunately,
in the case of phase-randomized Poissonian distributed
light source, Corollaries 1 and 2 in the Appendix can be
used to bound YB,0,⋆, YB,1,1, YB,1,1eB,1,1 and YB,1,1e¯B,1,1 an-
alytically, where e¯B,1,1 ≡ 1 − eB,1,1. More importantly,
these bounds are effective to analyze the key rate for-
mula to be reported in Sec. IV. Following the trick used
in Refs. [9, 10], by using the statistics of either all the
kB different photon intensities or all but the largest one
used by Alice and Bob depending on the parity of kB,
Corollaries 1 and 2 imply the following tight bounds
YB,0,⋆ ≥
kB∑
i,j=1
pj|BAeB,0,iQB,i,j, (4a)
YB,1,1 ≥ Y ↓B,1,1 ≡
kB∑
i,j=1
Ao
B,1,iAoB,1,jQB,i,j − C2B,2, (4b)
YB,1,1eB,1,1 ≤ (YB,1,1eB,1,1)↑ ≡
kB∑
i,j=1
Ae
B,1,iAeB,1,jQB,i,jEB,i,j ,
(4c)
YB,1,1eB,1,1 ≥ (YB,1,1eB,1,1)↓
≡
kB∑
i,j=1
Ao
B,1,iAoB,1,jQB,i,jEB,i,j − C2B,2, (4d)
3and
YB,1,1e¯B,1,1 ≥ (YB,1,1e¯B,1,1)↓
≡
kB∑
i,j=1
Ao
B,1,iAoB,1,jQB,i,jE¯B,i,j − C2B,2 (4e)
for B = X, Z. (The reason for using e and o as superscripts
is that it will be self-evident from the discussion below
that for fixed B and j, there are even number of non-
zero terms in Ae
B,j,i and odd number of non-zero terms
in Ao
B,j,i.) For the above inequalities, in case kB is even,
then
Ae
B,j,i = Aj(µB,i, {µB,1, µB,2, · · · , µB,i−1, µB,i+1, · · · , µB,kB})
(5a)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , kB and j = 0, 1. Furthermore,
Ao
B,1,1 = 0 (5b)
and
Ao
B,1,i = A1(µB,i, {µB,2, µB,3, · · · , µB,i−1, µB,i+1, · · · , µB,kB})
(5c)
for i = 2, 3, · · · , kB. In addition,
CB,2 =
(
kB∑
ℓ=2
µB,2µB,3 · · ·µB,ℓ−1µB,ℓ+1 · · ·µB,kB
)
kB∑
i=2

 1µB,i∏t6=1,i(µB,i − µB,t)

exp(µB,i)− kB−2∑
j=0
µj
B,i
j!



 . (5d)
Here I use the convention that the term involving 1/µB,i
in the above summards with dummy index i is equal to
0 if µB,i = 0.
Whereas in case kB is odd, then
Ao
B,1,i = A1(µB,i, {µB,1, µB,2, · · · , µB,i−1, µB,i+1, · · · , µB,kB})
(5e)
for i = 1, 2, · · · , kB. Furthermore,
Ae
B,j,1 = 0 (5f)
and
Ae
B,j,i = Aj(µB,i, {µB,2, µB,3, · · · , µB,i−1, µB,i+1, · · · , µB,kB})
(5g)
for j = 1, 2 and i = 2, 3, · · · , kB. In addition,
CB,2 =
(
kB∑
ℓ=1
µB,1µB,2 · · ·µB,ℓ−1µB,ℓ+1 · · ·µB,kB
)
kB∑
i=1

 1µB,i∏t6=i(µB,i − µB,t)

exp(µB,i)− kB−1∑
j=0
µj
B,i
j!



 . (5h)
Note that in Eq. (5),
A0(µ, S) =
− exp(µ)
∏
s∈S
s
∏
s∈S
(µ− s)
(6a)
and
A1(µ, S) =
− exp(µ)
∑
s∈S

∏
s′∈S
s′ 6=s
s′


∏
s∈S
(µ− s)
. (6b)
Note that different upper and lower bounds for YB,1,1
have been obtained using similar Vandermonde matrix
inversion technique in Ref. [23]. The differences between
those bounds and the actual value of YB,1,1 depend on
the yields YB,i,j with i, j ≥ 1. In contrast, the difference
between the bound in Inequalities (4b) and the actual
value of YB,1,1 depend on YB,i,j with i, j ≥ kB. Thus, In-
equality (4b) and similarly also Inequality (4c) give more
accurate estimates of YB,1,1 and YB,1,1eB,1,1, respectively.
Furthermore, the bounds in Ref. [23] also work for the
case of µB,kB = 0. It is also not clear how to extend their
method to bound for yields other than the two-single-
photon events that are needed in computing the key rate
for twin-field [25] and phase-matching [26] MDI-QKDs.
IV. THE KEY RATE FORMULA
The secure key rate R is defined as the number of
bits of secret key shared by Alice and Bob at the end
of the protocol divided by the number of photon pulse
pairs they have sent to Charlie. In fact, the derivation
of the key rate formula in Refs. [9–11, 27] for the case of
standard QKD can be easily modified to the case of MDI-
4QKD by making the following correspondences. (See also
the key rate formula used in Ref. [24] for MDI-QKD.)
The vacuum event in the standard QKD is mapped to
the event that both Alice and Bob send a vacuum pho-
ton pulse to Charlie. The single photon event is mapped
to the event that both Alice and Bob send a single pho-
ton to Charlie. The multiple photon event is mapped to
the event that Alice and Bob are both sending neither a
vacuum nor a single photon pulse to Charlie. In the case
of forward reconciliation, the result is
R ≥ p2
Z
{
〈exp(−µ)〉ZYZ,0,⋆ + 〈µ exp(−µ)〉2ZYZ,1,1[1−H2(ep)]− ΛEC −
〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
ℓraw
[
6 log2
(
χ
ǫsec
)
+ log2
(
2
ǫcor
)]}
,
(7)
where 〈f(µ)〉Z ≡
∑kZ
i=1 pi|Zf(µZ,i), 〈f(Z, i, j)〉i,j ≡∑kZ
i,j=1 pi|Zpj|Zf(Z, i, j), H2(x) ≡ −x log2 x − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function, ep is the
phase error rate of the single photon events in the raw
key, and ΛEC is the actual number of bits of informa-
tion that leaks to Eve as Alice and Bob perform error
correction on their raw bits. It is given by
ΛEC = fEC〈QZ,i,jH2(EZ,i,j)〉i,j (8)
where fEC ≥ 1 measures the inefficiency of the error-
correcting code used. In addition, ℓraw is the raw sifted
key length measured in bits, ǫcor is the upper bound of
the probability that the final keys shared between Alice
and Bob are different, and ǫsec = (1−pabort)‖ρAE−UA⊗
ρE‖1/2. Here pabort is the chance that the scheme aborts
without generating a key, ρAE is the classical-quantum
state describing the joint state of Alice and Eve, UA is
the uniform mixture of all the possible raw keys created
by Alice, ρE is the reduced density matrix of Eve, and
‖·‖1 is the trace norm [28–30]. In other words, Eve has at
most ǫsec bits of information on the final secret key shared
by Alice and Bob. (In the literature, this is often referred
to it as a ǫcor-correct and ǫsec-secure QKD scheme [27].)
Last but not least, χ is a QKD scheme specific factor
which depends on the detailed security analysis used. In
general, χ may also depend on other factors used in the
QKD scheme such as the number of photon intensities kX
and kZ [9–11].
In Inequality (7), the phase error of the raw key ep
obeys [9, 31]
ep ≤ eX,1,1 + γ¯
(
ǫsec
χ
, eX,1,1,
sXYX,1,1〈µ exp(−µ)〉2X
〈QX,i,j〉i,j ,
sZYZ,1,1〈µ exp(−µ)〉2Z
〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
)
(9)
with probability at least 1 − ǫsec/χ, where 〈f(µ)〉X ≡∑kX
i=1 pi|Xf(µX,i),
γ¯(a, b, c, d) ≡
√
(c+ d)(1 − b)b
cd
ln
[
c+ d
2πcd(1− b)ba2
]
,
(10)
and sB is the number of bits that are prepared and
measured in B basis. Clearly, sZ = ℓraw and sX ≈
p2
X
sZ〈QX,i,j〉i,j/(p2Z〈QZ,i,j〉i,j). I also remark that γ¯ be-
comes complex if a, c, d are too large. This is because in
this case no ep ≥ eX,1,1 exists with failure probability a.
In this work, all parameters are carefully picked so that
γ¯ is real.
There are two ways to proceed. The most general way
is to directly find a lower bound for YZ,1,1. Specifically,
by substituting Inequalities (4a), (4b) and (9) into In-
equality (7), I obtain the following lower bound of the
key rate
R ≥
kZ∑
i,j=1
BZ,i,jQZ,i,j − p2Z
{
〈µ exp(−µ)〉2
Z
C2
Z,2[1−H2(ep)]
+ΛEC +
〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
ℓraw
[
6 log2
(
χ
ǫsec
)
+ log2
(
2
ǫcor
)]}
,
(11)
where
BZ,i,j = p2Z
{〈exp(−µ)〉ZAeZ,0,ipj|Z
+〈µ exp(−µ)〉2
Z
Ao
Z,1,iAoZ,1,j[1−H2(ep)]
}
. (12)
Here I would like to point out that unlike the cor-
responding key rate formulae for standard QKD in
Refs. [7, 9–11], a distinctive feature of the key rate for-
mula for MDI-QKD in Eq. (11) is the presence of the C2
Z,2
term. From Eq. (5), provided that µZ,i − µZ,i+1 are all
greater than a fixed positive number, the value of C2
Z,2 de-
creases with kZ. This is the reason why the MDI version
of a QKD scheme may require more decoys to attain a
5key rate comparable to the corresponding standard QKD
scheme.
There is an alternative way to obtain the key rate
formula discovered by Zhou et al. [18] that works for
BB84 [22] and the six-state scheme [32]. Suppose the
photon pulses prepared by Alice and Bob in Step 1 of the
MDI-QKD protocol in Sec. II both contain a single pho-
ton. Suppose further that they are prepared in the same
basis. Then, from Charlie and Eve’s point of view, this
two-single-photon state are the same irrespective of their
preparation basis. Consequently, YX,1,1 = YZ,1,1 (even
though eX,1,1 need not equal eZ,1,1). That is to say, the
secure key rate in Inequality (7) also holds if YZ,1,1 there
is replaced by YX,1,1. (Here I stress that the key genera-
tion basis is still Z. But as YX,1,1 = YZ,1,1, I could use the
bound on YX,1,1 to obtain an alternative key rate formula
for the same MDI-QKD scheme.) Following the same
procedure above, I get
R ≥
kZ∑
i,j=1
B′
Z,i,jQZ,i,j +
kX∑
i,j=1
BX,i,jQX,i,j
− p2
Z
{
〈µ exp(−µ)〉2
Z
C2
X,2[1−H2(ep)] + ΛEC
+
〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
ℓraw
[
6 log2
(
χ
ǫsec
)
+ log2
(
2
ǫcor
)]}
, (13)
where
B′
Z,i,j = p
2
Z
〈exp(−µ)〉ZAeZ,0,ipj|Z (14a)
and
BX,i,j = p2Z〈µ exp(−µ)〉2ZAoX,1,iAoX,1,j [1−H2(ep)]. (14b)
V. TREATMENTS OF PHASE ERROR AND
STATISTICAL FLUCTUATION DUE TO FINITE
RAW KEY LENGTH ON THE SECURE KEY
RATE
In order to compute the lower bound on the key rate
R in Inequalities (11) and (13), I need to know the value
of eX,1,1 through the Inequality (9). More importantly, I
need to take into consideration the effects of finite raw
key length on the key rate R due to the statistical fluc-
tuations in eX,1,1 and QZ,i,j’s. Here I do so by means of
a McDiarmid-type of inequality in statistics first proven
in Refs. [33, 34] and recently extended in Ref. [10].
Fluctuation of the first term in the R.H.S. of Inequal-
ity (11) due to finite raw key length can be handled by
Hoeffding inequality for hypergeometrically distributed
random variables [9–11, 35], which is a special case of the
McDiarmid inequality. Using the technique reported in
Refs. [9, 10], the first term in the R.H.S. of Inequality (11)
can be regarded as a sum of sZ hypergeometrically dis-
tributed random variables each taking on values from
the set {〈QZ,i,j〉i,jBZ,i,j/(pi|Zpj|Z)}kZi,j=1. Using Hoeffding
inequality for hypergeometrically distributed random
variables [35], I conclude that the measured value of∑
i,j BijQZ,i,j minus its actual value is greater than
〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
[
ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sZ
]1/2
Width
({
BZ,i,j
pi|Zpj|Z
}kZ
i,j=1
)
with
probability at most ǫsec/χ, where Width of a finite set
of real numbers S is defined as maxS −minS.
The value of eX,1,1 in the finite sampling size situation is
more involved. Here I adapt the recent results in Ref. [10]
to give four upper bounds on eX,1,1. Surely, I pick the best
upper bound out of these four in the key rate analysis.
The first step is to use the equality
eX,1,1 =
YX,1,1eX,1,1
YX,1,1
(15a)
=
YX,1,1eX,1,1
YX,1,1eX,1,1 + YX,1,1e¯X,1,1
. (15b)
To get the first two upper bounds of eX,1,1, I
follow Ref. [10] by using Inequalities (4b), (4c)
and (4e) together with applying Hoeffding in-
equality for hypergeometrically distributed random
variables to study the statistical fluctuations of∑kX
i,j=1 AeX,1,iAeX,1,jQX,i,jEX,i,j ,
∑kX
i,j=1AoX,1,iAoX,1,jQX,i,j
and
∑kX
i,j=1AoX,1,iAoX,1,jQX,i,jE¯X,i,j . The result is
eX,1,1 ≤ (YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑
+∆YX,1,1eX,1,1
Y ↓
X,1,1 −∆YX,1,1
(16)
and
eX,1,1 ≤
[
(YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑
+∆YX,1,1eX,1,1
] [
(YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑
+(YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓
+∆YX,1,1eX,1,1 −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1
]−1
(17)
each with probability at least 1− 2ǫsec/χ, where
∆YX,1,1eX,1,1 =
[ 〈QX,i,j〉i,j〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sX
]1/2
×
Width
({Ae
X,1,iAeX,1,j
pi|Xpj|X
}kX
i,j=1
)
, (18a)
∆YX,1,1 = 〈QX,i,j〉i,j
[
ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sX
]1/2
×
Width
({Ao
X,1,iAoX,1,j
pi|Xpj|X
}kX
i,j=1
)
(18b)
and
∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1 =
[ 〈QX,i,j〉i,j〈QX,i,jE¯X,i,j〉i,j ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sX
]1/2
×
Width
({Ao
X,1,iAoX,1,j
pi|Xpj|X
}kX
i,j=1
)
. (18c)
6Note that in the above equations, 〈f(X, i, j)〉i,j ≡∑kX
i,j=1 pi|Xpj|Xf(X, i, j).
Both the third and the fourth bounds of eX,1,1 use
Eq. (15b), Inequality (4e) and the modified McDiarmid
inequality in Ref. [10]. For the third one, the result is
eX,1,1 ≤ (YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑
(YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑ + (YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1
+∆eX,1,1 (19)
with probability at least 1− 2ǫsec/χ, where
∆eX,1,1
=
[ 〈QX,i,j〉i,j〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sX
]1/2 [
(YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1
]
Width
({Ae
X,1,iAeX,1,j
pi|Xpj|X
}kX
i,j=1
)
×
[
(YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1 + (YX,1,1eX,1,1)↓
(
1− 〈QX,i,j〉i,j
sX〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j
)
+
〈QX,i,j〉2i,j
s2
X
〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j
kX
max
i,j=1
{Ae
X,1,iAeX,1,j
pi|Xpj|X
}]−1
×
[
(YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1 + (YX,1,1eX,1,1)↓
(
1− 〈QX,i,j〉i,j
sX〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j
)
+
〈QX,i,j〉2i,j
s2
X
〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j
kX
min
i,j=1
{Ae
X,1,iAeX,1,j
pi|Xpj|X
}]−1
.
(20)
And the fourth bound is
eX,1,1 ≤ (YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑
(YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↑
+ (YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1
+ rˆ
[
ln(χ/ǫsec)
2
]1/2
(21)
with probability at least 1− 3ǫsec/χ, where
rˆ2 ≈ y2
k2
X∑
m=1
1
w(m) − x
(
− 1
y + (t−∑i<m n(i) + 1)x+minW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
− 1
y + (t−∑i<m n(i) + 1)x+maxW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
+
2
Width(W) ln
{
y + (t−∑i<m n(i) + 1)x+maxW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
y + (t−∑i<m n(i) + 1)x+minW +∑i<m n(i)w(i) + µ[w(m) − x]
})∣∣∣∣∣
n(m)
µ=0
. (22)
In the above equation,
y = (YX,1,1e¯X,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1e¯X,1,1, (23a)
t ≈ sX〈QX,i,jEX,i,j〉i,j〈QX,i,j〉i,j , (23b)
x =
(YX,1,1eX,1,1)
↓ −∆YX,1,1eX,1,1
t
(23c)
and
W =
{ 〈QX,i′,j′〉i′,j′AeX,1,iAeX,1,j
sXpi|Xpj|X
}kX
i,j=1
(23d)
Last but not least, I need to define w(m) and n(m). Re-
call that by following the analysis in Ref. [10], there is
a one-one correspondence between a random variable in
W taking the value of 〈QX,i′,j′〉i′,j′AeX,1,iAeX,1,j/(sXpi|Xpj|X)
and an event that a photon pulse pair is prepared by
Alice (Bob) using intensity µX,i (µX,j) both in basis X
and that the Bell basis measurement result announced
by Charlie is inconsistent with the photon states pre-
pared by Alice and Bob. Now let us arrange the k2
X
ele-
ments in the set W are arranged in descending order as
{w(1), w(2), · · · , w(k2X )}. Then, n(i) is the number of Bell
basis measurement events that corresponds to the value
of w(i) ∈ W .
There is an important subtlety that requires attention.
In almost all cases of interest, each summard in Eq. (22)
consists of three terms. The first two are positive and
the third one is negative. The sum of the first two terms
almost exactly equal to the magnitude of the third term.
7Hence, truncation error is very serious if one directly use
Eq. (22) to numerically compute rˆ. The solution is to ex-
pand each term in powers of 1/Dm and/or 1/Em defined
below. This gives
rˆ2
≈ y
2Width(W)2
3
k2
X∑
m=1
n(m)
DmEm
(
1
D2m
+
1
DmEm
+
1
E2m
)
,
(24)
where
Dm = y+(t−
∑
i<m
n(i)+1)x+minW+
∑
i<m
n(i)w(i) (25a)
and
Em = y + (t−
∑
i<m
n(i) + 1)x+minW +
∑
i<m
n(i)w(i)
+ n(m)(w(m) − x)
= y + (t−
∑
i≤m
n(i) + 1)x+minW +
∑
i≤m
n(i)w(i).
(25b)
(Note that only the leading term is kept in Eq. (24).
This is acceptable because the next order term is of order
of about 1/100 that of the leading term in all cases of
practical interest.)
With all the above discussions, to summarize, the se-
cure key rate R of this ǫcor-correct and ǫsec-secure QKD
scheme in the finite raw key length situation is lower-
bounded by
R ≥
kZ∑
i,j=1
BZ,i,jQZ,i,j − 〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
[
ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sZ
]1/2
Width
({ BZ,i,j
pi|Zpj|Z
}kZ
i,j=1
)
− p2
Z
{
〈µ exp(−µ)〉2
Z
C2
Z,2[1−H2(ep)]
+fEC〈QZ,i,jHs(EZ,i,j)〉i,j + 〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
ℓraw
[
6 log2
(
χ
ǫsec
)
+ log2
(
2
ǫcor
)]}
. (26a)
and
R ≥
kZ∑
i,j=1
B′
Z,i,jQZ,i,j +
kX∑
i,j=1
BX,i,jQX,i,j − 〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
[
ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sZ
]1/2
Width
({ B′
Z,i,j
pi|Zpj|Z
}kZ
i,j=1
)
− 〈QX,i,j〉i,j×
[
ln(χ/ǫsec)
2sX
]1/2
Width
({ BX,i,j
pi|Xpj|X
}kX
i,j=1
)
− p2
Z
{
〈µ exp(−µ)〉2
Z
C2
X,2[1−H2(ep)] + fEC〈QZ,i,jHs(EZ,i,j)〉i,j
+
〈QZ,i,j〉i,j
ℓraw
[
6 log2
(
χ
ǫsec
)
+ log2
(
2
ǫcor
)]}
. (26b)
I remark that the R.H.S. of the above inequalities im-
plicitly depends on eX,1,1 whose upper bound obeys In-
equalities (16), (17), (19), (21) and (24). Furthermore,
when using the key rate in Inequality (26a), χ = 9 =
4 + 1 + 4 for the first three inequalities concerning eX,1,1
and χ = 10 for the last inequality concerning eX,1,1 [10].
While using the key rate in Inequality (26b) instead of
Inequality (26a), χ = 9, 10, 10, 11 for Methods A, B, C
and D, respectively. (For reason for χ to increase by 1
except for Method A by switching the rate formula from
Inequality (26a) to Inequality (26b) is due to the inclu-
sion of the finite-size statistical fluctuations of the lower
bound on YX,1,1.)
Compare with the corresponding key rate formula for
standard QKD scheme, the most noticeable difference is
the presence of additional terms and factors involving
C2
B,2 which tend to lower the key rate. Fortunately, CB,2
roughly scale as µkB
B,1 so that in practice, these terms and
factors are negligible if kB >∼ 2 to 3. Finally, I remark
that the in the limit of sZ → +∞, the key rate formulae
in Inequalities (26a) and (26b) are tight in the sense that
these lower bound are reachable although the condition
for attaining them is highly unlikely to occur in realistic
channels.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To study the key rate, I use the channel model reported
by Ma and Razavi in Ref. [24], which I called the MR
channel. For this channel,
QX,i,j = 2β
2
ij [1 + 2β
2
ij − 4βijI0(αXij) + I0(2αXij)], (27a)
QX,i,jEX,i,j = e0QX,i,j−2(e0−ed)β2ij [I0(2αXij)−1], (27b)
8QZ,i,j = Q
(E)
ij +Q
(C)
ij (27c)
and
QZ,i,jEZ,i,j = edQ
(C)
ij + (1− ed)Q(E)ij , (27d)
where I0(·) is the modified Bessel function of the first
kind,
αBij =
√
ηAµB,iηBµB,i
2
, (27e)
βij = (1− pd) exp
(
−ηAµX,i + ηBµX,j
4
)
, (27f)
e0 =
1
2
, (27g)
Q
(C)
ij = 2(1− pd)2 exp
(
−ηAµZ,i + ηBµZ,j
2
)
×[
1− (1− pd) exp
(
−ηAµZ,i
2
)]
×[
1− (1− pd) exp
(
−ηBµZ,j
2
)]
(27h)
and
Q
(E)
ij = 2pd(1 − pd)2 exp
(
−ηAµZ,i + ηBµZ,j
2
)
×[
I0(2αZij)− (1− pd) exp
(
−ηAµZ,i + ηBµZ,j
2
)]
.
(27i)
Here ed is the misalignment probability, pd is the dark
count rate per detector. Moreover, ηA (ηB) is transmit-
tance of the channel between Alice (Bob) and Charlie.
They are given by
ηA = ηd10
−ηattLA/10 (27j)
and similarly for ηB, where LA is the length of the fiber
connecting Alice to Charlie, ηd is the detection efficiency
of a detector, and ηatt is the transmission fiber loss con-
stant.
I remark that the MR channel model assumes that the
partial Bell state measurement is performed using linear
optics with idea beam and/or polarization beam splitters.
It also assumes that all photon detectors are identical and
that the dead time is ignored. Moreover, this channel
does not consider the use of quantum repeater.
The state-of-the-art key rate formula for decoy-state
MDI-QKD with finite raw key length is the one by Mao
et al. in Ref. [20], which extended an earlier result by
Zhou et al. in Ref. [18]. (Note that even higher key
rates have been reported by Xu et al. [16] and Zhou et
al. [18]. Note however that the first work applied brute
force optimization as well as the Chernoff bound on a
much longer raw key. Its effectiveness in handling short
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FIG. 1. Provably secure optimized key rates R as a function of
distance L between Alice and Bob for Nt = 10
10 and ǫsec/χ =
ǫcor = 10
−10. The red dotted curve is the state-of-the-art
provably secure key rate reported in Ref. [20]. The black solid
curve is the rate computed for (3, 2)G; and the blue dashed
curve is rate for (3, 3)R. The rates for (kX ≥ 3, kZ ≥ 3)G
and (kX ≥ 4, kZ ≥ 4)R is higher than that of (3, 2)G by about
33%. But they are omitted here as those curves would visually
almost overlap with the black solid curve in this semi-log plot.
raw key length situation is not apparent. Whereas the
second work assumed that the statistical fluctuation is
Gaussian distributed which is not justified in terms of un-
conditional security.) To compare with the provably se-
cure key rate reported in Ref. [20], I use their settings by
putting ed = 1.5%, pd = 6.02 × 10−6, ηatt = 0.2 db/km,
ηd = 14.5%, fEC = 1.16, and LA = LB = L/2 where
L is the transmission distance between Alice and Bob.
For the security parameters, I follow Ref. [20] by set-
ting ǫsec/χ = 10
−10 although a more meaningful way is
to set ǫsec divided by the length of the final key to a
fixed small number [11]. Whereas for ǫcor, its value has
not been specified in Refs. [20]. Fortunately, Inequal-
ity (26a) implies that the provably secure key rate does
not sensitively dependent on ǫcor. Here I simply set it to
10−10.
Fig. 1 compares the key rates when the total num-
ber of photon pulse pairs prepared by Alice and Bob,
Nt ≈ ℓraw/(p2Z〈QZ,i,j〉i,j) is set to 1010. For each of the
curves, the number of photon intensities kX (kZ) used for
X (Z) are fixed. The smallest photon intensities µX,kX and
µZ,kZ are both set to be 10
−6. The optimized key rate is
then calculated by varying the other µX,i’s, µZ,i’s as well
as pi|X, pi|Z and pZ by a combination of random sampling
(with a minimum of 107 samples to a maximum of about
109 samples per data point on each curve) and adaptive
gradient descend method (that is, the step size is adjusted
dynamically to speed up the descend). For some of the
curves, I introduce additional constraints that µX,i = µZ,i
so as to reduce the number of different photon intensities
used. To aid discussion, I refer to the unconstrained and
constrained situations by (kX, kZ)G and (kX, kZ)R, respec-
tively.
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FIG. 2. Provably secure optimized key rates R as a function
of distance L between Alice and Bob for Nt = 10
9, ǫsec/χ =
ǫcor = 10
−7. The red dotted curve is the provably secure
key rate reported in Ref. [18]. The black solid curve is the
rate computed for (3, 2)G; and the blue dashed curve is rate
for (3, 3)R. The rates for (kX ≥ 3, kZ ≥ 3)G are about the
same as that of (3, 2)G while those of (kX ≥ 4, kZ ≥ 4)R are
a little bit lower (higher) than that of (3, 2)G for short (long)
transmission distances. They are omitted here to avoid curve
jamming.
The R−L graphs in Fig. 1 clearly show the advantage
of using the method in this text in computing the prov-
ably secure (optimized) key rate. The black curve, which
is the distance-rate graph of (3, 2)G that uses four differ-
ent photon intensities, is much better than the red one
(which also uses four different photon intensities) orig-
inally reported in Ref. [20]. In fact, for any distance
L between Alice and Bob, the key rate of the (3, 2)G
method is at least 2.25 times that of the state-of-the-art
key rate reported in Ref. [20]. (I also mention on pass-
ing that the rate of the black curve is even higher than
that of the two decoy key rate reported in Ref. [16] using
a much longer raw key length of ℓraw = 10
12.) Besides,
the (3, 2)G method extends the working distance between
Alice and Bob from slightly less than 60 km to slightly
over 130 km. The blue dashed curve is the key rate of
(3, 3)R, which uses the same set of three different photon
intensities for both preparation bases. Although it uses
one less photon intensity, it still outperforms the key rate
of the red curve when L >∼ 45 km.
To further illustrate the power of this method, I com-
pare the key rates here with the ones obtained in Ref. [18]
in which they used four photon states and the following
paramters: ed = 1.5%, pd = 10
−7, ηatt = 0.2 db/km,
ηd = 40%, fEC = 1.16, LA = LB = L/2 and ǫsec/χ =
ǫcor = 10
−7. The optimized key rates are then found us-
ing the same method that produces Fig. 1. As shown in
Fig. 2, the optimized key rate of (3, 2)G (the black curve
that uses four different photon intensities) is at least 90%
higher than those reported in Ref. [18]. Just like the pre-
vious comparison, the key rate of (3, 3)R which uses only
three different photon intensities is better than the one
0 5  100 1 200
-9
-8
-7
-6
-
-4
-3
L ( km )
lo
g
1
0
(
R
)
Fig.3
FIG. 3. Provably secure optimized key rates R as a function
of distance L between Alice and Bob for ℓraw = 10
10 and
κ = 10−15 and ǫcor = 10
−10. The black solid curve is for
(3, 2)G and the blue dashed curve is for (3, 3)R. The rates for
(kX ≥ 3, kZ ≥ 3)G and (kX ≥ 4, kZ ≥ 4)R is higher than that
of (3, 2)G by about 18%. These additional curves are omitted
here as visually they almost overlap with the black solid curve
in this semi-log plot.
reported in Ref. [18] when L >∼ 60 km. Last but not
least, the maximum transmission distance increases from
about 87 km to about 156 km for (3, 2)G and 162 km
for (4, 3)G (the later not sure in the figure to avoid curve
crowding).
In a sense, instead of ǫsec/χ, a fairer security parame-
ter to use is κ, namely ǫsec per number of bits of the final
key [11]. Fig. 3 depicts the R−L curves of various meth-
ods when κ = 10−15 and ǫcor = 10
−10. Here instead of
fixingNt, I keep ℓraw = 10
10 which corresponds to a much
greater value of Nt in general. The blue dashed curve is
the rate for (3, 3)R which uses three photon intensities.
It already achieves a non-zero key rate at a distance of
slightly greater than 160 km. The black curve is the rate
for (3, 2)G which uses four photon intensities. It allows
Alice and Bob to share a secret key over a distance close
to 200 km. This finding makes sense for a larger raw key
length ℓraw implies smaller statistical fluctuations in our
estimates of various yields and error rate, which in turn
increase the provably secure key rate and the maximum
transmission distance.
Tables I and II shows the provably secure optimized
key rates using various values of kX and kZ for the case
of fixing ǫsec/χ and κ, respectively. The following points
can be drawn from these figures and tables. First, for
the unconstrained photon intensity situation, the opti-
mized key rate increases as kX increases. For instance, as
shown in Table I, the key rate of (4, 2)G is at least 39%
higher than that of (3, 2)G by fixing ǫsec/χ. And from Ta-
ble II, the corresponding increase in key rate by fixing κ
is about 18% in the distance range from 0 km to 150 km.
(I do not draw these curves in Figs. 1 and 3 because they
almost overlap with the (3, 2)G curve using the same plot-
ting scales.) Second, for the constrained photon intensity
10
L/km 0 50
(3, 2)G 7.49× 10
−5 1.50× 10−6
(3, 3)R 9.65× 10
−6 1.25× 10−7
(3, 3)G 8.51× 10
−5 1.82× 10−6
(4, 2)G 1.04× 10
−4 2.22× 10−6
(4, 3)G 1.04× 10
−4 2.24× 10−6
(4, 4)R 3.10× 10
−5 3.75× 10−7
(4, 4)G 1.04× 10
−4 2.23× 10−6
TABLE I. Optimized secure key rates for Nt = 10
10 and
ǫsec/χ = ǫcor = 10
−10.
situation, the optimized key rate increases as kX = kZ in-
creases. These findings can be understood by the fact
that the more decoy intensity used, the closer the vari-
ous bounds of yields and error rates are to their actual
values. Third, the constrained key rate is in general sev-
eral times lower than the corresponding unconstrained
one. So, using the same set of photon intensities for the
two bases is not a good idea, at least for the MR channel.
There is an interesting observation that requires in-
depth explanation. From Table II, for the case of fixing
kX and κ, the increase in R due to increase in kZ is in-
significant. Moreover, Table I shows that for the case
fixing ǫsec/χ and kX, significant increase in key rate oc-
curs only when kX = 3. The reason is that for the MR
channel [24], it turns out that the key rate computed by
Inequality (26b) is greater than that computed by In-
equality (26a). That is to say, the lower bound of YX,1,1
is a better estimate of the single photon pair yield that
the lower bound of YZ,1,1. Thus, increasing kZ only gives
a better estimate of YZ,0,⋆. Since I fix the lowest pho-
ton intensity to 10−6, which is very close to the vacuum
state, the major error in estimating YZ,0,⋆ comes from
finite-size statistical fluctuation. Consequently, by fixing
a large enough raw key length ℓraw, the use of more than
two photon intensities for the Z does not improve the
provably secure key rate in practice. In other words, the
improvement on the provably secure key rate by increas-
ing kZ alone for the MR channel occurs only when kZ is
small, say, about 2 to 3 and when ℓraw is small.
There is a systematic trend that worth reporting.
For the case of using unconstrained photon intensities,
Method D plus the use of YX,1,1 to bound the single
photon-pair yield gives the highest key rate over almost
the whole range of distance L. Only when close to the
maximum transmission distance that the best rate is
computed using Method C and YX,1,1. Whereas for the
case of constrained photon intensities, for short transmis-
sion distance, the best rate is computed using Method D
plus YZ,1,1. For longer transmission distance, the best
rate is due to Method B and YX,1,1.
L/km 0 50 100 150
(3, 2)G 3.23 × 10
−4 2.85 × 10−5 2.44 × 10−6 1.51 × 10−7
(3, 3)R 8.37 × 10
−5 6.67 × 10−6 4.33 × 10−7 1.27 × 10−8
(3, 3)G 3.23 × 10
−4 2.85 × 10−5 2.44 × 10−6 1.51 × 10−7
(4, 2)G 3.82 × 10
−4 3.39 × 10−5 2.89 × 10−6 1.78 × 10−7
(4, 3)G 3.82 × 10
−4 3.39 × 10−5 2.89 × 10−6 1.78 × 10−7
(4, 4)R 1.70 × 10
−4 1.32 × 10−5 8.27 × 10−7 2.64 × 10−8
(4, 4)G 3.82 × 10
−4 3.39 × 10−5 2.89 × 10−6 1.78 × 10−7
TABLE II. Optimized secure key rates for ℓraw = 10
10, κ =
10−15 and ǫcor = 10
−10.
VII. SUMMARY
In summary, using the BB84 scheme in the MR chan-
nel as an example, I have reported a key rate formula
for MDI-QKD using Possionian photon sources through
repeated use the inversion of Vandermonde matrix and
a McDiarmid-type inequality. This method gives a prov-
ably secure key rate that is at least 2.25 times that of the
current state-of-the-art result. It also shows that using
five photon intensities, more precisely the (4, 2)-method,
gives an additional 18% increase in the key rate for the
MR channel. This demonstrates once again the effec-
tiveness of using McDiarmid-type inequality in statisti-
cal data analysis in physical problems. Provided that the
photon source is sufficiently close to Possionian,
Note that the Vandermonde matrix inversion technique
is rather general. As pointed out in Remark 1 in the Ap-
pendix, by modifying the proof of Lemma 2, one can
show that C3i ≥ 0 if k is even and C3i < 0 if k is odd
for all i ≥ k. Thus, I can find the lower bound of YB,0,2
and YB,2,0. In other words, I can extend the key rate cal-
culation to the case of twin-field [25] or phase-matching
MDI-QKD [26]. Note further that Inequalities (4) are
still valid by replacing the Ae
B,j,i’s and AoB,j,i’s by their
perturbed expressions through standard matrix inversion
perturbation as long as the photon sources are sufficiently
close to Possionian. In this regard, the theory developed
here also applies to these sources. Interested readers are
invited to fill in the details. Last but not least, it is in-
structive to extend this work to cover other MDI-QKD
protocols as well as more realistic quantum channels that
take dead time and imperfect beam splitters into account.
Appendix A: Auxiliary Results On Bounds Of
Yields And Error Rates
I begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let µ1, µ2, · · · , µk be k ≥ 2 distinct real num-
bers. Then
k∑
i=1
µℓi∏
t6=i(µi − µt)
= 0 (A1)
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for ℓ = 0, 1, · · · , k − 2.
Proof. Note that the L.H.S. of Eq. (A1) is a symmetric
function of µi’s. Moreover, only its first two terms involve
the factor µ1 − µ2 in the denominator. In fact, the sum
of the these two terms equals
µℓ1
∏
t>2(µ2 − µt)− µℓ2
∏
t>2(µ1 − µt)
(µ1 − µ2)
∏
t>2[(µ1 − µt)(µ2 − µt)]
.
By applying reminder theorem, I know that the numera-
tor of the above expression is divisible by µ1 − µ2. Con-
sequently, the L.H.S. of Eq. (A1) is a homogeneous poly-
nomial of degree ≤ ℓ − k + 1. But as ℓ ≤ k − 2, this
means the L.H.S. of Eq. (A1) must be a constant. By
putting µi = t
i for all i and by taking the limit t→ +∞,
I conclude that this constant is 0. This completes the
proof.
Following the notation in Ref. [9], I define
Ca+1,i =
(−1)k−aa!
i!
k∑
t=1
µitSta∏
ℓ 6=t(µt − µℓ)
, (A2)
where
Sta =
∑′
µt1µt2 · · ·µtk−a−1 (A3)
with the primed sum being over all tj ’s 6= i obeying 1 ≤
t1 < t2 < · · · < tk−a−1 ≤ k. The following lemma is an
extension of a result in Ref. [9].
Lemma 2. Let µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µk ≥ 0. Suppose
0 ≤ i < k. Then
Ca+1,i =
{
−1 if a = i,
0 otherwise.
(A4)
Whereas if i ≥ k, then{
C1i ≥ 0 and C2i < 0 if k is even,
C1i ≤ 0 and C2i > 0 if k is odd.
(A5)
Proof. Using the same argument as in the proof of
Lemma 1, I conclude that Ca+1,i is a homogeneous poly-
nomial of degree ≤ i− a.
Consider the case of i ≤ a so that Ca+1,i is a constant.
By putting µt = δ
t for all t and then taking the limit
δ → 0+, it is straightforward to check that Ca+1,i = 0 if
i < a and Ca+1,i = −1 if i = a.
It remains to consider the case of a < i < k. I first con-
sider the subcase of a = 0. Here C1i contains a common
factor of
∏k
t=1 µt, which is of degree k > i. Therefore, I
could write
∏k
t=1 µt = C1iF where F is a homogeneous
polynomial of degree ≥ i. As a consequence, either C1i
or F contains µ1 and hence all µt’s. Thus, C1i must be
a constant for i < k. By setting µk = 0, I know that
C1i = 0.
Next, I consider the subcase of a = 1. Since i > 1,
from the findings of the first subcase, I arrive at
C2i =
(−1)k−1
i!
k∑
t=1
T1µ
i−1
t −
(∏k
ℓ=1 µℓ
)
µi−2t∏
ℓ 6=t(µt − µℓ)
=
(−1)k−1T1
i!
k∑
t=1
µi−1t∏
ℓ 6=t(µt − µℓ)
− C1,i−1
=
(−1)k−1T1
i!
k∑
t=1
µi−1t∏
ℓ 6=t(µt − µℓ)
, (A6)
where T1 is the symmetric polynomial
T1 =
k∑
t=1
µ1µ2 · · ·µt−1µt+1 · · ·µk. (A7)
By Lemma 1, I find that C2i = 0 as i < k.
The third subcase I consider is a = 2. As i > 2,
C3i =
2(−1)k
i!
k∑
t=1
T2µ
i−1
t − T1µi−2t +
(∏k
ℓ=1 µℓ
)
µi−3t∏
ℓ 6=t(µt − µℓ)
,
(A8)
where
T2 =
∑′
µt1µt2 · · ·µtk−2 (A9)
with the primed sum over all tj ’s with 1 ≤ t1 < t2 <
· · · < tk−2 ≤ k. By Lemma 1, I get C3i = 0 as i < k.
By induction, the proof of the subcase a = 2 can be
extended to show the validity for all a ≤ k and a < i < k.
This shows the validity of Eq. (A4)
The proof of Eq. (A5) can be found in Ref. [9]. I
reproduce here for easy reference. By expanding the
1/(µ1 − µt)’s in Cai as a power series of µ1 with all the
other µt’s fixed, I obtain
C1i =
(−1)k
i!
(
k∏
t=1
µt
)[
µi−k1
k∏
r=2
(
1 +
µr
µ1
+
µ2r
µ21
+ · · ·
)
+ f(µ2, µ3, · · · , µk)
]
+O(
1
µ1
) (A10)
for some function f independent of µ1. As C1i is a ho-
mogeneous polynomial of degree ≤ i, by equating terms
in powers of µ1, I get
C1i =
(−1)k
i!
(
k∏
t=1
µt
) ∑
t1+t2+···+tk=i−k,
t1,t2,··· ,tk≥0
µt11 µ
t2
2 · · ·µtkk
(A11)
for all i ≥ k. As all µt’s are non-negative, C1i ≥ 0 if k is
even and C1i ≤ 0 if k is odd.
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By the same argument, I expand all the 1/(µ1 − µt)
terms in C2i in powers of µ1 to get
C2i =
(−1)k−1T1
i!
∑
t1+t2+···+tk=i−k
t1>0,t2,··· ,tk≥0
µt11 µ
t2
2 · · ·µtkk
+ f ′(µ2, · · · , µk) (A12)
for some function f ′ independent of µ1. By recursively
expanding Eq. (A2) in powers of µ2 but with µ1 set to 0,
and then in powers of µ3 with µ1, µ2 set to 0 and so on,
I conclude that whenever i ≥ k, then C2i < 0 if k is even
and C2i > 0 if k is odd. This completes the proof.
Remark 1. By the same technique of expanding each
factor of 1/(µ1 − µt) in Ca+1,i in powers of µ1, it is
straightforward to show that if i ≥ k and j ≥ 1, then
C2j+1,i ≥ 0 and C2j,i ≤ 0 provided that k is even. And
C2j+1,i ≤ 0 and C2j,i ≥ 0 provided that k is odd.
The following theorem is an extension of a similar re-
sult reported in Ref. [9] by means of an explicit expression
of the inverse of a Vandermonde matrix.
Theorem 1. Let µ1 > µ2 > · · · > µk ≥ 0 and µ˜1 >
µ˜2 > · · · > µ˜k˜ ≥ 0. Suppose
+∞∑
a,b=0
µai
a!
µ˜bj
b!
Aab ≡
+∞∑
a,b=0
Ma+1,iM˜b+1,jAab = Bij (A13)
for all i = 1, 2, · · · , k and j = 1, 2, · · · , k˜. Then,
Aab =
k∑
i=1
k˜∑
j=1
(
M−1
)
a+1,i
(
M˜−1
)
b+1,j
Bij
+
+∞∑
I=k
Ca+1,IAIb +
+∞∑
J=k˜
C˜b+1,JAaJ
−
+∞∑
I=k
+∞∑
J=k˜
Ca+1,IC˜b+1,JAIJ (A14)
for all a = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1 and b = 0, 1, · · · , k˜ − 1. Here
(
M−1
)
a+1,i
=
(−1)k−a−1a!Sia∏
t6=i(µi − µt)
(A15)
and similarly for
(
M˜−1
)
b+1,j
.
Proof. Note that for any fixed a = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1 and
b = 0, 1, · · · , k˜ − 1,
+∞∑
b=0
µ˜bj
b!
Aab =
k∑
i=1
(
M−1
)
a+1,i
(
Bij −
+∞∑
b=0
+∞∑
I=k
µIi
I!
µ˜bj
b!
AIb
)
.
(A16)
Here M−1 is the inverse of the k × k matrix
(Ma+1,i)
k
a+1,i=1. From Ref. [9], the matrix elements of
M−1 are related to inverse of certain Vandermonde ma-
trix and are given by the expression immediately after
Eq. (A14). From Lemma 2, Eq. (A16) can be rewritten
as
+∞∑
b=0
µ˜bj
b!
Aab =
k∑
a=1
(
M−1
)
a+1,i
Bij +
+∞∑
b=0
+∞∑
I=k
µ˜bj
b!
Ca+1,IAIb.
(A17)
By repeating the above procedure again, I find that for
any fixed a = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1 and b = 0, 1, · · · , k˜ − 1,
Aab =
k∑
i=1
k˜∑
j=1
(
M−1
)
a+1,i
(
M˜−1
)
b+1,j
Bij
−
+∞∑
I=k
+∞∑
t˜=0
Ca+1,IC˜b+1,t˜AIt˜ +
+∞∑
J=k˜
C˜b+1,JAaJ .
(A18)
Here the k˜×k˜ matrix C˜ is defined in the exactly the same
as the k×k matrix C except that the k and µt’s variables
are replaced by k˜ and the corresponding µ˜t’s. Substitut-
ing Eq. (A4) into the above equation gives Eq. (A14).
Applying Lemma 2 and Theorem 1, in particular, the
Inequality (A5), I arrive at the following two Corollaries.
Corollary 1. Suppose the conditions stated in Theo-
rem 1 are satisfied. Suppose further that Aab = 0 for
all b > 0 and a ≥ 0; and Aa0 ∈ [0, 1] for all a. Then
A00 ≥
k∑
i=1
(
M−1
)
1i
Bi0. (A19)
Corollary 2. Suppose the conditions stated in Theo-
rem 1 are satisfied. Suppose further that Aab ∈ [0, 1]
for all a, b. Then
A00 ≥
k∑
i=1
k˜∑
j=1
(
M−1
)
1i
(
M˜−1
)
1j
Bij −
+∞∑
I=k
+∞∑
J=k˜
C1I C˜1J
(A20a)
and
A11 ≤
k∑
i=1
k˜∑
j=1
(
M−1
)
2i
(
M˜−1
)
2j
Bij (A20b)
provided both k and k˜ are even. Furthermore,
A11 ≥
k∑
i=1
k˜∑
j=1
(
M−1
)
2i
(
M˜−1
)
2j
Bij −
+∞∑
I=k
+∞∑
J=k˜
C2I C˜2J
(A20c)
if both k and k˜ are odd.
Remark 2. Clearly, each of the bounds in the above
Corollary are tight. Although the conditions for attain-
ing the bound in Inequality (A20b) are not compatible
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with those for attaining the bounds in Inequalities (A20a)
and (A20c), the way I use these inequalities in Secs. IV
and V ensures that it is possible to attaining all these
bounds in the key rate formula.
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